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Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional
World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too,
Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs
Lawrence J. Foxt
I. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER ATTACK
While most of the world has slept, even the world of law-
yers, the Big 5 accounting firms have mounted a frontal assault
on the legal profession that threatens to destroy the foundation
of professional independence, loyalty and confidentiality that
the lawyers of America have always promised the public. Ig-
noring our rules that lawyers may not share fees with nonlaw-
yers,' the critical rule that is designed to assure professional
independence (he who pays the piper calls the tune), the ac-
counting firms have hired thousands of lawyers who leave their
law firms on Friday and show up on Monday doing the exact
same thing for the exact same clients, but now as employees of
the nonlawyer Big 5.
In order to rationalize the fact that these lawyers are bla-
tantly violating our profession's fee-sharing rule, these lawyers
now assert that they are not practicing law; rather they are
practicing tax, ERISA, employment, merger and acquisitions,
or otherwise consulting. To compound this ethical violation of
Rule 5.4, they violate our profession's rules governing conflicts
of interest and confidentiality, and our profession's prohibitions
on limitations on lawyer liability, on restrictive covenants and
on the direct solicitation of clients-all because they tow the
Big 5 line that our professional rules are outdated, not worthy
of respect, and unnecessary in the brave new economic order,
where business success is the only value. But all of this should
come as no surprise to those of us who have been watching with
disillusionment and dismay. Because, while the accountants
t Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
1. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
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have set out to attack the rules of the legal profession, they
have also set out to undermine their own.
The core business of the Big 5 is the audit function. I take
a back seat to no one in my respect for what these firms are
supposed to do and the importance we all should attach to the
work the auditors must perform. The integrity of the financial
reporting function for public companies literally makes the con-
cept of public company possible. Knowing that these highly-
trained individuals bring their expertise and independence to
their daunting task means that when a public company tells us
what its balance sheet shows and how it has done for the last
year, we are not receiving data colored by the interests of man-
agement in their expensive stock options, in their exalted sala-
ries and bonuses, or in securing the adulation of a fawning fi-
nancial press. Rather we know that these financial statements
have been the subject of the healthy skepticism, rigorous
auditing standards and consistent accounting principles estab-
lished by the independent auditing profession. As a result,
millions of us, either directly or indirectly, rely on these finan-
cial statements in committing our life savings, our retirement
accounts, and our children's educational funds to investments
in companies whose financials have received the Big 5's "Good
Housekeeping Seal of Approval."
But the Big 5 long ago struck out on a new course. Though
the audit function gave them entr6e into the inner sanctum of
virtually every public company in America, the audit business
promised slow growth and little romance. So the Big 5 (the Big
Eight when this all began) decided to leverage their connec-
tions by offering other services-consulting, advisory, investi-
gatory, data processing, websites, e-commerce and now, even
legal. They have done so by trading on their good names, capi-
talizing on the special relationships their client's need for their
clean opinion accords, and without regard to the effect their
earning of ever higher non-audit fees would have on their inde-
pendence.
It took the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
issue a wake-up call to the accounting profession.2 Increasingly
the corporate watchdogs in Washington, D.C. have expressed
concern that the rapidly expanding non-audit work provided by
the Big 5 threatens not only the appearance of their independ-
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Top Accounting Industry Group Sets
Conflict-of-Interest Compliance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2000, at B2.
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ence, but the fact of their independence in conducting the
auditing function.3
One of the more recent manifestations of this concern came
in a letter to the American Bar Association's (ABA) Multidisci-
plinary Practice Commission from the Chief Accountant of the
SEC.4 In that communication, Lynn Turner first reviewed the
law, particularly United States v. Arthur Young & Co. in which
the Supreme Court observed:
"... . the private attorney's role [is] the client's confidential adviser
and advocate, a loyal representative whose duty it is to present the
client's case in the most favorable possible light. An independent cer-
tified public accountant performs a different role. By certifying the
public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the in-
vesting public. This 'public watchdog' function demands that the ac-
countant maintain total independence from the client at all times and
requires complete fidelity to the public trust."5
Turner then noted that the SEC itself has identified the ren-
dering of legal services as something that must be considered in
making independence determinations.
"Certain concurrent occupations of accountants engaged in the prac-
tice of public accounting involve relationships with clients which may
jeopardize the accountant's objectivity and, therefore, his independ-
ence. In general, this situation arises because the relationships and
activities customarily associated with this occupation are not com-
patible with the auditor's appearance of complete objectivity or be-
cause the primary objectives of such occupations are fundamentally
different from those of a public accountant ....
A legal counsel enters into a personal relationship with a client
and is primarily concerned with the personal rights and interests of
such clients. An independent accountant is precluded from such a
relationship under the Securities Acts because the role is inconsistent
with the appearance of independence required of accountants in re-
porting to public investors."6
Turner concluded that the Office of Chief Accountant would
consider a firm's independence from an SEC registrant "to be
3. See id.
4. See Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant of the SEC, to
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Jan. 22, 1999), available at
<http'J/wvw.abanet.org/cpr/turner.html>.
5. Id. (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 807, 817-
18 (1984)).
6. Id. (quoting SEC, CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES
§§ 602.02.e.i, 602.02.e.ii.).
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impaired if the firm also provides legal advice to the registrant
or its affiliates. 7
Nonetheless the accounting profession, in the name of the
Big 5, have continued to expand their legal services, hiring new
lawyers, launching their own law firms (McKee Nelson Ernst &
Young),8 and establishing special relationships with existing
firms. To justify this clear compromise of their independence,
they employ the same artifice (these people are not practicing
law) they have used to ignore our profession's rules-and to the
same effect. In each case, the core values of a profession lie
bleeding on the ground.
Equally troubling is the recent announcement from the
SEC that half the partners of PricewaterhouseCoopers, in-
cluding thirty-one top executives, had violated the auditor in-
dependence rules that prohibit investment in audit clients of
the firm.9 The SEC found "widespread' noncompliance, which
reflects 'serious structural and cultural problems in the firm.'" 10
The statistics regarding the violations are just staggering. A
total of 1,885 staffers committed a total of 8,064 violations,
with 45% of the infractions carried out by partners auditing
public companies." The SEC suggested that fifty-two compa-
nies hire another firm to replace PricewaterhouseCoopers. 12
The response from the offending firm was alternatively dismis-
sive ("'the vast majority of [the] infractions resulted from an
honest failure to appreciate the importance of compliance, fail-
ure to check' restricted investments, and a 'lack of under-
standing of the intricacies of the rules'"13), defensive ("'[alt no
time was the integrity of our audits compromised"14), and
7. Id.
8. I have addressed this topic elsewhere. See Lawrence J. Fox, New
Firm: Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A23.
9. See Elizabeth MacDonald & Michael Schroeder, Report by SEC Says
Pricewaterhouse Violated Rules on Conflicts of Interest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7,
2000, at A3.
10. Id. (quoting the SEC's report summarizing a yearlong review of audi-
tor conflicts of interest at PricewaterhouseCoopers).
11. See id.
12. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Accountant Faces Salvo from SEC, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at A3.
13. MacDonald & Schroeder, supra note 9, at A3 (quoting a letter from
PricewaterhouseCoopers's chairman, Nicholas Moore, and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, James Schiro).
14. Id. (quoting Kenton Sicchitano, PricewaterhouseCoopers's global
managing partner of regulatory and independence issues).
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apologetic (we are making "'sweeping changes to our proc-
esses'").15
Far more instructive (and more troubling) was the re-
sponse from unnamed sources in the profession, not lamenting
this professional "black eye," but rather railing against the in-
dependence rules, saying they have to be modernized, arguing
that the firms have set up their now famous firewalls (pre-
sumably the same ones that they use to take on directly con-
flicting matters) which separate those who work on an audit
from those who want to invest in companies being audited, as-
serting that the rules have not kept up "with the firms' evolving
push into every market niche under the sun."16
In other words, just like the way the accountants wish to
repeal the legal profession's imputation rules governing con-
flicts of interest ("if we impute conflicts beyond the individuals
working on the engagement we'd have to turn down so much
business"), they also hope to repeal the rules governing inde-
pendence of their own profession so that no one will look
askance at the millions in non-audit services they are billing
their audit clients, and everyone will be comfortable with ac-
countants and their families investing in companies their firms
audit.
I am a director of Big 5 audited closed-end investment
companies. Our investors, my fellow directors and I rely every
day on the independence of a Big 5 firm to audit our companies
without any outside influence. The last thing we would want to
learn is that the firm's partners were investing in our compa-
nies or that the firm was providing extensive non-audit services
to our advisor.
Perhaps this latest development should come as no sur-
prise. It was Sam DiPiazza of PricewaterhouseCoopers who
testified before the American Bar Association Multidisciplinary
Practice Commission on behalf of his profession's foray into the
practice of law (oops! legal consulting).'7 To support his argu-
ment that the legal profession should not be concerned, Mr.
DiPiazza asserted that the two professions, accountants and
15. Id. (quoting Kenton Sicchitano, PricewaterhouseCoopers's global
managing partner of regulatory and independence issues).
16. Id.
17. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Mar. 11, 1999) (written remarks of Sam DiPiazza, Jr., Managing Partner, Tax
Services-Americas PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP), available at <httpJ/vww.
abanet.org/cpr/dipiazza.html> [hereinafter DiPiazza Remarks].
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lawyers, were actually twins separated at birth.18 After all,
both have the same values, confidentiality, loyalty and profes-
sional independence, 19 a view surprisingly echoed by someone
who really knows much better, Professor Geoffrey Hazard in
his keynote address at this Symposium. 20
I have already addressed elsewhere how the accounting
profession's notions of loyalty and confidentiality bear little re-
semblance to ours.21 For them loyalty is an individual matter
and entirely subjective; for us loyalty is a firm-wide matter and
our conduct is judged objectively. For them, confidentiality is
waived to fulfill their attest function; to us, it admits of only
two exceptions, imminent death or serious bodily harm.22
When it comes to professional independence, we are even
further apart. Moreover, unlike loyalty, as to which the ac-
countants could, if they were really committed, adopt our stan-
dard, but exactly like confidentiality where, because they are
auditors, they cannot, the accountants' standard of professional
independence only has in common with the lawyer requirement
the same name. Their "independence" is independence from
the client. When we read that Arthur Andersen has opined on
the financial statements of some company, we want to know
that Arthur Andersen was free of influence from its client, able
to bring healthy skepticism to its work to protect the public
from relying upon financial statements that have not been pre-
pared in accordance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples after an audit conducted in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards. Like the Chief Accountant of the
SEC, we want no advocates here, but rather professional dis-
tance and objectivity.
For lawyers, professional independence is a completely dif-
ferent concept. Yes, it means we give our clients our best ad-
vice, even if it is not what the client wants to hear. But it also
means that we are free from outside influences-especially the
government, other clients, third party payers and our own self-
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Future of the Profession, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2000) (transcribing Professor Hazard's address).
21. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice (Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks of Lawrence J. Fox, Drinker Biddle &
Reath, LLP), available at <http'J/www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html>; Written
comments of Lawrence J. Fox to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/fox2.html>.
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(b) (1983).
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interest-to permit us to exercise unbridled loyalty and zealous
advocacy on behalf of our clients.
Mr. DiPiazza betrays his (and undoubtedly his entire pro-
fession's) misunderstanding when he asserts:
To suggest that the threat to independent judgment is unacceptably
higher when a non-lawyer has an economic interest in a law firm
than when a lawyer is under pressure from a long-standing client to
take a particular position or is encouraged by a senior partner in his
own firm to accommodate a client's interests, strikes me as a doubtful
proposition.n
It may be doubtful to him, but it is anything but to us. Being
"under pressure" from a long-time client is exactly where the
pressure should be. Being "encouraged" by a senior partner is
exactly who should be doing the encouraging. We are beholden
to our clients (so long as the suggested conduct is lawful and
ethical) and we are supervised by other lawyers (whose guid-
ance we follow unless the ethical or legal violation is clear).
The former is our client to whom we are ethically committed
and the latter is a lawyer, similarly conversant with our values,
subject to our rules and liable to the same disciplinary sanc-
tions as we. It is pressure from nonclient, nonlawyers that we
must be ever vigilant to guard against and it is precisely those
influences that compromise our professional independence.
This leads me to an even more fundamental point. In the
rush for lawyers to become part of the great MDP movement,
for other enterprises large and small to own and operate law
firms, we have forgotten entirely what it means to be a lawyer.
We are not just another set of service providers. We are
not just another cohort of business consultants. We are not just
another kiosk at a one-stop shopping center for financial serv-
ices.
We are officers of the court. We have the power to file
complaints, draft subpoenas, take testimony under oath, ap-
pear before tribunals from justice of the peace court to the
United States Supreme Court, make representations of fact
and law to judges, issue opinions that permit great corporate
and individual transactions to occur, confer privilege on conver-
sations with our clients.
We have responsibilities to improve the civil justice sys-
tem, to seek improvements in the law, to provide pro bono
service to those who cannot afford lawyers, to race to the de-
23. DiPiazza Remarks, supra note 17.
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fense of judges, to enhance the organized bar, to be responsible
citizens of our communities.
Indeed, we are a priesthood. Perhaps we have forgotten
this. Perhaps we have become too cynical or too interested in
billable hour goals and our lofty financial expectations. Per-
haps we have left ourselves vulnerable to the takeover that is
now upon us by failing to remember our mission and failing to
fulfill our responsibilities.
But that does not mean it is too late. The great offensive
by the Big 5 could be turned into an advantage. It might not
only unite the profession to resist this disastrous incursion, but
also motivate us to refocus and rededicate our efforts to recap-
turing our own professional values.
II. RUMINATIONS
The foregoing was written weeks before the Symposium
that was held at the University of Minnesota Law School on
February 25-26, 2000. Since then events have continued apace,
and I have listened to the many thoughtful speakers the Min-
nesota Law Review recruited to participate in this event. As a
result it seemed important to offer some additional observa-
tions to the ongoing dialogue.
A. THE ONE-STOP SHOPPING ARGUMENT DIES
One of the foundations of the multidisciplinary practice ar-
gument is that clients are better off with, want, yes, even de-
mand, one-stop shopping. Break down the artificial barriers
created by Rule 5.4, and we will give our clients what they de-
serve, or so goes the argument. Thus, the accounting firms set
out to be all things to all people. And the only two impedi-
ments to accomplishing that goal remain the lawyers, who de-
spite overwhelming criticism, hang onto the "antiquated" prin-
ciple that lawyer independence requires that lawyers not work
for others, and the quiet voice of the SEC whose Chief Account-
ant I quoted above. 24 Each argue that one-stop shopping might
be desirable, but not if the cost to be paid was greater than the
so-called benefit that might accrue from making one telephone
call instead of two.
On February 16, 2000, it was reported that Pricewater-
houseCoopers was splitting off its tax and auditing work from
24. See text accompanying supra notes 4-7.
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its other consulting business, which in turn might be split into
two or more entities.25 Of course, the devil is in the details,
which have not been announced (and how the ownership is al-
located among the principles of these new firms will determine
whether what we are dealing with is form over substance); yet,
it does appear that this Big 5 firm recognizes that the SEC will
not tolerate the threat to auditors' professional independence
caused by the offering of so many other services to audit clients
of the firms.
The second shoe dropped when on March 1, 2000 the ac-
counting firm of Ernst & Young announced that it would be
selling its non-audit business to Cap Gemini S.A. of France, a
public company with its headquarters in Paris.26 Again, we do
not yet know how "independent" these various businesses will
be-one from the other-but it would appear that Ernst &
Young audit clients will have to go to the great inconvenience of
making a second call if they want to secure other services from
the auditing firm's former colleagues.
The lessons from these press releases are profound. First,
consolidation, we have been told, is as inevitable as it is irre-
versible. But these announcements prove both of those propo-
sitions wrong. There are centrifugal forces at work that are
more powerful than the centripetal forces that brought all this
"consulting" together. And if PricewaterhouseCoopers can be
split into a number of enterprises, the civil disobedience of the
accounting firms in hiring thousands of lawyers can be re-
versed as well. The fait accompli with which our profession has
been presented ("now that we've hired 5,000 lawyers we dare
you to do something about it") is far more easily undone than
the splitting off of all of Ernst & Young's consulting business
will turn out to be.
Second, the profession has been lectured, even hectored, at
this Symposium and elsewhere that the economic forces of pro-
gress are so powerful the only choice the profession has is to lie
supine on the beach, let the tsunami sweep over us, and get
drenched by the new paradigm of one-stop shopping, open com-
petition for services, and lawyers working for nonlawyers-our
25. See Elizabeth MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopers Nears Plan for Re-
structuring Involving Split or Sale, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2000, at C11; see also
Elizabeth MacDonald, PricewaterhouseCoopers Will Divide into Two or More
Parts, Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2000, at B8.
26. See John Tagliabue, Cap Gemini To Acquire Ernst & Young's Consult-
ing Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at C1.
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once great profession reduced to the lowest common denomina-
tor role as just another profit center at a department store for
consulting services.
But progress is not like that. Symposium commentators
may claim Rule 5.4 is as anachronistic as the manufacturer of
buggy whips in an age of automobiles, 27 or note that when
President Clinton was inaugurated there were five websites
and today there are 150,000,000,28 but what we are talking
about when we discuss Rule 5.4 and professional independence
has nothing to do with e-commerce or biochemical engineering.
It has to do with values, values that are enduring, values that
we might have to fight harder to maintain against forces that
do not understand, appreciate or treasure them. But whether
our clients are producing quill pens or Palm pilots makes no
difference when what we are guarding against is
(a) interference by nonlaw trained masters who wish us to take
short cuts to maximize profits, (b) the loss of the privilege and
confidentiality because it is not clear whether legal services are
what is being delivered and (c) disloyalty reflected in "new" con-
flicts of interest rules that establish willy-nilly so-called fire
walls between service providers in adjacent officers working on
opposite sides of a matter, or allow each professional to look
herself in the mirror and ask the subjective question "how do I
feel about taking on this representation?" The arguments
against Rule 5.4 premised on a changing world have no more
validity than if we demanded that the preacher change the
substance of his Sunday sermon simply because it was being
narrowcast live over the Internet.
Third, the PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young
maneuvers occurred because the value of professional inde-
pendence was deemed more critical than one-stop shopping
convenience. The values we espouse as lawyers, through the
protections provided in Rule 5.4, are at least as important as
the value of auditor independence. I was surprised-no
shocked is a better word-that not one of the academics at this
Symposium asserted the importance of these values. Rather
the only comments in this regard that I recall were cynical and
27. See Peter C. Kostant, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, The
Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26,
2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
28. See Edward S. Adams, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, The
Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26,
2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
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snide. One professor even asserted that he was "sick" (though
not "sick to death") of hearing about core values.29
B. THE GUERiLLA WAR CONTINUES
I have likened here and elsewhere the Big 5 assault on the
legal profession to a guerilla war.30 The analogy does not work
perfectly because, while it is true that the insurgents are acting
by stealth, choosing their moments in an opportunistic way, the
legal establishment is not yet at war. Only now is the profes-
sion even beginning to wake up to the fact that it must mobi-
lize. Yet the accountants are not quietly waiting for the next
battle. They assault when and where they can.
The March 5, 2000 New York Times Magazine contains a
splendid example. There Arthur Andersen ran a full-page color
advertisement. 31 The main text could not be more worthy of
approval. Under the headline "E-steem" appears a picture of a
beautiful African-American woman dressed in a striking orange
suit. The copy goes on to trumpet the fact that Arthur Ander-
sen is 'Title Sponsor of Clean Your Closet Week" designed to
provide used clothing for those looking for entry into the job
market.32 Good p.r. Good image. Good cause. Then the adver-
tisement lists Arthur Andersen's services: "Assurance" (that's
the one they used to call auditing), "Business Consulting" and,
continuing in alphabetical order, to "Legal Services."33 What is
this? Is Arthur Anderson finally admitting that the lawyers
who work for the firm are practicing law? Maybe. A "note" at
the bottom in six-point type observes "The services offered in
particular areas may depend on local regulations. In some lo-
cations [Philadelphia? Minneapolis?], legal and/or tax services
are prohibited by Andersen Legal, the international network of
law firms that is associated with Andersen Worldwide SC."34
Putting aside the odd syntax (the services are not "prohib-
ited by Andersen Legal," they are prohibited by rules like Rule
5.4 in every state and many other countries) and the mislead-
ing use of "some locations"--I assume they mean some whole
29. Charles Wolfram, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, The Fu-
ture of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26,
2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
30. See Fox, supra note 8, at A23.
31. E-steem, N.Y. TIiEs MAG., Mar. 5, 2000, at 43.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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countries-why is Arthur Andersen touting its legal services in
a magazine 99% of whose circulation is in "locations" where
those services may not be provided? This is a coolly calculated
opening wedge, we can be sure, to this firm's not so subtle cam-
paign to snare more clients for its thousand plus lawyers
working in the United States who, of course, we are told (and
the SEC is told) are not practicing law.
C. THE MYTH OF CLIENT DEMAND
One of the unquestioned givens in this Symposium was cli-
ent demand for MDPs. It is surprising that such a skeptical
band as law school academics would so blithely accept this
"fact," particularly given the present law school world's love af-
fair with empirical evidence. Where is the data? The only
thing that came close to proof of the client demand proposition
were the reports that, when asked, client groups, by and large,
want choice. Give them an alternative, and they will decide.
But that litany does not substitute for evidence of client
demand. For my part, I am waiting after thirty years for the
first client to come to me, or anyone at my firm for that matter,
and tell me "I wish you had economic experts on staff," "we
wish you would provide environmental listing services," "I wish
you could help me invest the assets of my mom's estate."
More important, when asked whether they prefer more
choices, consumers will always say yes. I, for one, prefer
twenty flavors of ice cream, three different hot fudge sauces
and walnuts, peanuts and slivered almonds. But none of those
who are polled have ever been told the consequences of the
added choices. That would be too difficult to explain and might
give clients serious pause. So full disclosure of the implications
does not occur and the results of this unscientific testing is a
clear (but uninformed) vote for choice.
One wonders what the results would be if these clients
could learn what law professors teach their professional re-
sponsibility students about attorney-client privilege, confiden-
tiality, loyalty and maintaining professional independence, and
how fragile those values are, how they are under constant at-
tack and how important the y are to preserve. Although, I must
admit, from the content of the participants' speeches at the
Symposium one must wonder, as important as those issues are,
whether those things are being taught today at all.
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D. WHERE ARE THE PROFESSORS?
Everyone agrees that 5,000 lawyers are engaging in civil
disobedience when they assert they are not practicing law at
the Big 5 accounting firms. It was just this civil disobedience
that spurred the Commission to come up with its radical pro-
posal. I opened the Saturday session of the Symposium point-
ing out that, if the ABA and all fifty states had adopted the
Commission proposal, it would have made no difference be-
cause the Big 5 would not have registered as MDPs and would
have continued the fiction that the lawyers who work there are
not practicing law. The crisis confronting the profession then is
figuring out what to do about that.
No one picked up the challenge. More troubling, not a sin-
gle speaker suggested that the conduct of these lawyers is wor-
thy of condemnation. I must ask why that is so? We train law-
yers to be law-abiding. We test their competence and their
character and fitness. We make them take solemn oaths to up-
hold the law. We mandate they take continuing education
courses, including instruction in ethics.
Then when something like five percent of our profession
does not just violate our rules governing fee sharing (I suppose
they might have the temerity to argue that this civil disobedi-
ence is in support of an important cause, just like Rosa Parks
refusing to take a seat on the back of the bus), but also our
rules governing conflicts of interest, confidentiality, limitation
of liability and restrictive covenants, the academic world's re-
sponse varies from silence to outright approval. What does
that say about lawyers' obligations to be law-abiding? What
example does that set for the law students of America when our
moral and intellectual leaders stand silent?
Professor Bruce Green did argue that Rule 5.4 should be
repealed because it assumes that lawyers will sell out.35 Pro-
fessor Green asserts there is no basis for assuming such unfor-
tunate conduct from the members of our profession.3 6 But Pro-
fessor Green is demonstrably wrong. The need for Rule 5.4
35. See Bruce A. Green, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, The Fu-
ture of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26,
2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review); see also Bruce A.
Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Deri-
vation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1149-55 (2000) [hereinafter Green, Disciplinary Re-
strictions].
36. See Green, Disciplinary Restrictions, supra note 35, at 1147, 1151-53.
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does not rest on any assumptions. Its importance rests on the
actual conduct of the lawyers who went to work for the ac-
counting firms and how quickly they abandoned so many of our
ethical requirements. Having erected the fiction they are not
practicing law, they could then, with no further guilt or re-
criminations, ignore our other rules as well.
E. ARE THERE BARRISTERS AND SOLICITORS IN OUR FUTuRE?
The Big 5 really wish to change our rules governing impu-
tation of conflicts.3 7 Even if we abandon Rule 5.4, so long as
our profession insists on imputation, the Big 5 cannot accept
our ethical terms of engagement, because they do not impute;
indeed they could never have gotten as big as they are if impu-
tation were part of their rules governing conflicts. The idea
that a client who seeks legal services from one of the Big 5
would be informed whether the Big 5 firm represented the cli-
ent's adversary-a core value to the legal profession-is not one
of the possibilities at these accounting firms which are already
the world's largest MDPs.
There are some in the profession who also would like to
abandon imputation. A few of our largest firms think it is per-
fectly alright for their Paris office to be opposite their New York
office, maybe even the 43rd floor to be on the other side of the
44th. And some academics, including several at the Sympo-
sium, seemed prepared to compromise on this central point.38
Those who say let the market take care of all these matters, as
well as those who have far more faith in screening39 than this
author, would compromise the imputation principle, though few
if any of them would do so in the case of a litigation matter.
There are at least four troubling aspects to traveling down
this road of watered-down notions of loyalty. First, the idea of
separate conflict rules for litigation engagements confuses
decibel level with the concept of adverseness while, at the same
time, assuming, quite incorrectly I believe, that clients care
much more about the results in litigation than they do in
transactional matters. For some clients litigation is simply a
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983).
38. See Hazard, supra note 20, at 1088-89.
39. Screens are what we in the legal profession call the methods that are
put in place to protect confidential information; the accountants go us one bet-
ter and call them firewalls. Neither exist in a physical sense and "screens"
conveys much better how likely they are to work since screens are those items
we install in the spring to let in light, air and sound. .
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cost of doing business; a key merger, acquisition or application
for a franchise may determine whether the enterprise survives.
So the notion that clients do not care very much about having
their law firm show up on the other side of a non-litigation
matter does not comport with the reality of client apprehen-
sion.
Second, in abandoning imputation the proponents of con-
flicts-lite envision a system where market forces will solve the
problem. But that ignores how this will in fact play out. A law
firm will be representing corporation A in getting key financing
from investment bank B. After weeks of negotiations, A is sud-
denly informed its law firm is representing B, but "don't worry,
we have screened your lawyers from the lawyers at our firm
who represent B." The client is put in an impossible situation.
It must either accept the continued representation of the law
firm (wondering whether A is really receiving zealous represen-
tation now that B is also a client, perhaps a much more impor-
tant client of the firm) or change firms now, with the attendant
loss of momentum, experience and trust.
Third, as Dean Bayless Manning observed during the
Symposium, whether a representation should be classified as
transactional or litigation may be difficult to determine even at
the outset of a representation and, in any event, representa-
tions evolve. 40 If one set of loyalty rules apply at the beginning
of an engagement, but another set may apply later, which cli-
ent ends up with the firm and which one is forced to now look
elsewhere because the conflict that was not imputed, now is?
Fourth, and naturally following from three, if different
rules of imputation apply to non-litigation matters, will any of
my non-litigation partners want to remain in business with the
Drinker Biddle & Reath trial lawyers? Won't we become a
lodestone around their collective necks as they drag our higher
standard of loyalty around when, if they simply jettisoned us, a
whole array of new representations would be possible? Which
brings me to the thought that one fallout of all this tinkering
with our fundamental rules governing our commitment to our
clients may be a fracturing of the bar-trial and transac-
tional-with results whose consequences are hard to imagine.
40. See Bayless Manning, Remarks at the University of Minnesota, The
Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 26,
2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
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F. WHITHER PRO BONO?
This Essay cannot end without an important nod at pro
bono. Lawyers have an ethical obligation as officers of the
court to perform pro bono legal services. The topic is the sub-
ject of a hortatory Model Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule
6.1,41 and lawyers regularly contribute literally millions of
hours of services each year in this arena.
One of the great concerns with lawyers suddenly becoming
mere employees of Tony's Towing Service or American Express,
institutions whose obligation is to maximize profit, will be a
compromise of this commitment. Similarly, the type of cases
lawyers are willing to take is likely to change materially. For
the Big 5 and corporate America, whose idea of public service is
chairing the Symphony Ball or sitting on the Art Museum
board, representing unpopular causes and despicable clients
might prove quite uncomfortable. I know all to well-from the
reaction I have received as Chair of the ABA Death Penalty
Representation Project when I have sought assistance from in-
house counsel at major corporations for the unrepresented on
death row-that H&R Block and Merrill Lynch will not want to
be identified with "murderers" and Ku Klux Klan members,
even though we know that lawyers who take on this work are
not so identified under our lawyers' ethics.
When I raised this issue at the Symposium, again I was
shocked. I was, in effect, told, "You lawyers, do not undertake
that much pro bono anyway. So what's the big deal?"42 Tell
that to the fifty denizens of death row for whom our project has
recruited lawyers in the last two years, including the Minnea-
polis firms of Dorsey & Whitney, Robins, Kaplan, Miller &
Ciresi, Faegre & Benson, Lindquist & Vennum, and Fredrikson
& Byron. Tell that to the indigent clients of Leonard Street
and Deinard's storefront office in Minneapolis's Phillips neigh-
borhood. Tell that to the First Amendment lawyers the ACLU
has recruited across America to attack pandering politicians'
ideas for getting religion back into our public school classrooms.
Could the profession do more? Of course. Should it do
more? Undoubtedly. But that does not mean that what is be-
ing done must not be cherished, nurtured and praised, and that
41. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Charles Wolfram, Remarks at the University of Minnesota,
The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Feb. 26, 2000) (videotape on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
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this work is not seriously threatened if lawyers' roles are di-
minished and their control over their professional lives is
passed to nonlawyer bean counters. The solution for the inade-
quate level of pro bono commitment from the bar is to encour-
age more, not to permit practice settings in which the American
public is guaranteed to receive far less.
CONCLUSION
I write all of this with a heavy heart. The number of law-
yers willing to stand up and be counted on the survival of our
profession is far too few to respond to the brute forces of eco-
nomic hegemony. Maybe, just maybe, a few law professors and
lawyers will be inspired by these remarks to join the fray. It is
not too late; but it will be soon.
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